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INTRODUCTION 
 
“I’m down here for justice,” Charlie Foster told the state judge 
presiding over his assault trial.1  “We can do this the easy way or we 
can do it the hard way, Charles Foster,” the judge responded.2  “You 
violated my rights,” Foster pleaded.3  “Do you want to stay in this 
courtroom, sir?”  “You violated—” Foster tried to repeat himself, but 
the judge interrupted him.4  “Take him up to the jail.”5  Foster’s 
counsel attempted to intercede on Foster’s behalf, and again the 
judge interrupted:  “Allen versus Illinois.  Now, he is going back up to 
the jail.”6  And before the prosecution rested its case, Charlie Foster 
was removed from his own trial.7
Foster interrupted his judge several times, once in front of the 
jury.
 
8
 
 * Law clerk to the Honorable William D. Quarles, Jr., United States District Judge for the 
District of Maryland.  I drafted this Article while a member of The George Washington 
University Law School Class of 2011.  Many thanks to Marcy Bush and Richard Short for 
their guidance, and the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy and the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for giving me the opportunity to publish 
my work. 
  These interruptions formed the basis for the decision to expel 
 1 Foster v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1382, 1385 (11th Cir. 1982).  Foster and a co-defendant 
were charged in Florida court with two counts of assault with intent to commit a felony.  
Id. at 1383.  Foster was represented by a defense attorney, but on the afternoon of the 
third day of trial he requested to proceed pro se.  Id. at 1385.  The judge denied the mo-
tion and the defense counsel remained.  Id.  The jury convicted Foster of both counts of 
assault.  Id. at 1383.  The judge sentenced him to thirty years in prison (two consecutive 
fifteen-year sentences).  Id. 
 2 Id. at 1385. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 1384–86. 
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Foster.9  Each interruption of the proceedings was a response to a 
question directed to him, a request for permission to speak, or an 
“object[ion]”10—though he was not representing himself.11  Once, the 
judge told him that his disruptions would result in contempt pro-
ceedings or removal from the courtroom.12  When that single warning 
proved ineffective,13 the judge took a more extreme and more certain 
way to stop Foster’s protests:  removal from the courtroom14 under 
the precedent established in Illinois v. Allen.15
After the prosecution concluded its case-in-chief, the court in-
structed Foster’s attorney to tell Foster that he could return to trial if 
he behaved.
 
16  Foster chose to remain in the local jail.17  His attorney 
decided, without Foster, not to call any witnesses.18  The jury con-
victed him of assault.19
Foster appealed through the state courts without success, then pe-
titioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.
 
20  Among other 
things, Foster alleged that the state trial judge violated Foster’s Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights by expelling him from the cour-
troom and that this was an abuse of the judge’s discretion.21
 
 9 See id. at 1386 (quoting the trial judge:  “I’m sending him up the jail because he has dis-
rupted this Court. . . . [H]e is not going to disrupt this Court again.”). 
  The dis-
 10 For example, during his counsel’s cross-examination of the final prosecution witness, Fos-
ter objected to the form of a question:  “That’s a leading question.  My attorney led him.”  
Id. at 1385. 
 11 See id. 
 12 Id. at 1384–85. 
 13 At a conference, Foster, intent on ensuring that a missing witness appear, said he would 
“just have to be forced to take a contempt charge” if the witness did not appear in time to 
testify.  Id. at 1385. 
 14 See id. at 1385–86. 
 15 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343–44 (1970) (describing at least “three constitutionally 
permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant . . .”). 
 16 Foster, 686 F.2d at 1386. 
 17 Id.  On being invited to return to the courtroom, Foster stated that “[the judge] ordered 
me out, now I’ll not come down unless I receive a written order [to return to the cour-
troom].”  Id. 
 18 Id.  The only published decision in Foster’s case history does not indicate the defense at-
torney’s reasons for not calling witnesses. See id. (stating only that “[Foster’s attorney] 
rested his case for Foster without calling any witnesses”).  However, Foster’s co-defendant 
presented a defense.  Id. 
 19 Id. at 1383. 
 20 Id.  A writ of habeas corpus is “a procedure for obtaining a judicial determination of the 
legality of an individual’s custody.”  A state offender generally uses it to challenge the 
constitutionality of her state criminal conviction.  STEVEN H. GIFIS, BARRON’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 229–30 (5th ed. 2003). 
 21 Foster, 686 F.2d at 1383. 
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trict court and the Eleventh Circuit rejected the petition, finding that 
Foster was properly excluded from his trial.22
In 1970, the Supreme Court noted in Illinois v. Allen that “[o]ne of 
the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause 
is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of 
his trial.”
 
23  Yet the Court held that an accused loses that right if, 
through “misconduct,” she upsets the “dignity, order, and decorum” 
of the courtroom.24  The Court gave very little guidance on what be-
havior qualifies as misconduct.25  Further, the Court did not specify 
the standard of review for appellate courts reviewing trial court deci-
sions to expel, though it suggested a deferential abuse of discretion 
review.26
Ambiguity in the Allen rule has left trial judges with a complete 
lack of understanding of when they can remove a defendant from tri-
al, consistent with that defendant’s constitutional rights.  This has fa-
cilitated violations of the constitutional rights of people like Charlie 
Foster, who, though he interrupted the proceedings, did so only “for 
justice”—to pursue his rights through the trial process—not to thwart 
the trial itself or threaten anyone in the courtroom.
 
27  Further, at the 
appellate level, courts grant excessive deference to the trial court’s 
decision to remove defendants from the courtroom, thus giving trial 
judge the discretion to extend the boundaries of an already loose 
rule and further infringe on defendants’ rights.28
 
 22 Id. 
 
 23 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970). 
 24 Id. at 342–43 (describing defendant misconduct as “behavior . . . so disorderly, disruptive, 
and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the cour-
troom,” without providing specific examples of such behavior, other than the defendant 
Allen’s behavior, see discussion infra Part II.A). 
 25 Id. at 343 (holding that “a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial . . . [if] he 
nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and dis-
respectful . . . .”).  However, the Court also stated that “[n]o one formula for maintaining 
the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations.”  Id. 
 26 Id. (noting that the trial judge “must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circums-
tances of each case”).  The Court also found that “there is nothing . . . in [the trial] 
record to show that the judge did not act completely within his discretion” when he ex-
pelled Allen from the courtroom.  Id. at 347. 
 27 Charlie Foster’s behavior was different from William Allen’s, because Allen made very 
clear that he was trying to stop the trial.  See, e.g., id. at 340 (describing Allen’s physical 
disruptions and destruction of court documents and insisting, “[T]here’s not going to be 
no trial, either.”). 
 28 See, e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 284 F.3d 965, 968 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that the 
court of appeals reviews the district court’s expulsion of a defendant from trial for abuse 
of discretion, subject to harmless error analysis, and the court of appeals “s[aw] little 
need to second-guess the trial judge’s decision”); see discussion infra Part III.C. 
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This Article argues that contrary to the current application of the 
Allen rule, an accused’s right to be present at his or her trial—
particularly when it is a jury trial—cannot be involuntarily waived 
merely to preserve dignity and proper etiquette in the courtroom.  
Instead, trial courts should balance the accused’s right to be present 
in the courtroom against the effect of the disruption on the accused’s 
ability to receive a fair trial.  Courts should remove defendants from 
the courtroom only if removal will clearly and substantially increase 
the fairness of the trial.  The court must consider the defendant’s 
motivation, the potential for creating jury bias, and the ability of de-
fense counsel to present a case without the defendant.  Providing fac-
tors for the trial court to balance will also permit greater appellate 
oversight, limiting the likelihood of unreasonable extension of the 
removal rule. 
This Article begins with a discussion of the constitutional right to 
be present at one’s criminal trial and the right to a fair trial.  Part II 
describes the facts and Supreme Court’s analysis of Illinois v. Allen,29 
which established the current removal rule.  Part III analyzes and dis-
cusses the problems with Illinois v. Allen,30 and the evolution of the Al-
len rule from focusing on the court’s ability to conduct the trial31 into 
a preoccupation with maintaining an air of “dignity, order, and deco-
rum . . . [in] court proceedings.”32
Part IV proposes that, although a court should consider excluding 
the accused from trial a last resort, when it is forced to do so, it 
should consider the fairness of the proceedings, not the etiquette and 
decorum of the courtroom.  If the defendant’s continued presence is 
necessary to the accomplishment of a fair trial, the court must permit 
her to remain in the courtroom.  If her absence will clearly and sub-
stantially increase the fairness of the trial, the court will not be violat-
ing the defendant’s constitutional rights by ordering her exclusion 
until she agrees not to cause further disruptions.  This section pro-
poses five factors that a trial judge should consider in determining 
whether removal is appropriate.  These factors will not only provide a 
framework for trial judges to make a determination based on the de-
fendant’s fundamental rights, they will facilitate clearer appellate re-
view of trial court decisions to remove defendants. 
 
 
 29 See Allen, 397 U.S. at 337. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 343. 
 32 Id. (explaining that these things are not only “hallmarks of all court proceedings” but also 
explaining that there is “[n]o one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom 
atmosphere . . .”). 
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DISCUSSION 
I:  Fundamental Rights:  The Right to be Present at Proceedings and the Right 
to a Fair Trial 
The United States Constitution provides that any person accused 
of a crime is guaranteed a fair trial in which fact finding takes priority 
over prejudice, unfounded assumptions, and even efficiency.33  That 
right derives from protections afforded to individuals in the Fifth,34 
Sixth,35 and Fourteenth Amendments.36
A. The Right to be Present at Trial 
  The most effective means of 
guaranteeing this right is by allowing the defendant to be present at 
her trial so that she can either see the fairness of the process for her-
self, or observe the lack of fair process and petition for a remedy. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[o]ne of the most basic 
of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s 
right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of [her] trial.”37
 
 33 See, e.g., Danny J. Boggs, The Right to a Fair Trial, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 3–4 (comparing 
definitions of “fair trial” and concluding that most interpretations agree that it involves “a 
search for the truth,” and requires “an impartial decision maker, an atmosphere condu-
cive to consideration, with relevant evidence considered and irrelevant evidence ex-
cluded . . .”). 
  
When the defendant’s presence at a proceeding that is “critical” to 
 34 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . ; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 35 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).  See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 
532, 538–39 (1965) (noting that the Sixth Amendment right to “a speedy and public tri-
al” exists for the purpose of “guarantee[ing] that the accused would be fairly dealt with 
and not unjustly condemned”). 
 36 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ab-
ridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).  See, e.g., 
Estes, 381 U.S. at 560 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires state prosecutions to “at the least, comport with ‘the fundamental concep-
tion’ of a fair trial,” which includes “many of the specific provisions of the Sixth Amend-
ment” (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 562 (1965))); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 
309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 37 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970). 
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the outcome of the criminal process “would contribute to the fairness 
of the procedure,” she has a right to attend the proceeding.38
The right to be present stems from several fundamental rights.  
An accused literally cannot “be confronted with the witnesses against” 
her during the proceedings if she is not in the courtroom at the time 
that those witnesses take the stand.
 
39  In addition, her physical pres-
ence can “exert[] a moral force to inhibit [witnesses against the ac-
cused] from lying.”40  Presence at trial and all other jury proceedings 
gives the defendant the opportunity to “present” herself to the jury.41
The right to be present also facilitates the defendant’s ability to 
communicate with her attorney.  The attorney may need to make on-
the-spot decisions about case tactics during the proceedings, and the 
defendant must be present to communicate her preferences and en-
sure that the “lawyer presents a vigorous defense” and otherwise pro-
tects her rights.
 
42
The right to be present at judicial proceedings is not absolute.  It 
extends only to “critical” proceedings in which the defendant’s pres-
ence “contribute[s] to the fairness of the procedure.”
 
43  An accused 
can also choose to waive her right to be present,44 even at critical 
stages of the proceedings, so long as she comprehends the potential 
consequences of giving up that right and demonstrates that she is vo-
luntarily waiving her right to be present.45
Similarly, the defendant loses, or waives, her right to be present if 
she chooses to leave or voluntarily fails to appear, when she was 
present at the beginning of trial.
 
46
 
 38 See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987); see, e.g. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 
442, 455 (1912) (finding that voir dire of jurors and jury empanelment is a critical stage); 
United States v. Rosales-Rodriguez, 289 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that jury 
instructions are a critical stage). 
  This rule rests on the assumption 
that a defendant who attends part of her trial and is informed by the 
court of her duty to attend the rest of the proceeding would not 
 39 See generally Criminal Constitutional Law:  The Right of the Defendant to be Present (MB) 
§ 14A.02 (2011) [hereinafter “§ 14A.02”] (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 
(1965)). 
 40 The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 90, 98 (1970); see also Oken v. Warden, 233 
F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (internal ci-
tations omitted)) (noting that a witness may decide not to testify falsely when “looking at 
the man whom he will harm greatly” by lying). 
 41 The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, supra note 40, at 98. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745. 
 44 See § 14A.02 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (holding that waiver must 
be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”)). 
 45 See § 14A.02. 
 46 See id. (citing Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19–20 (1973)). 
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doubt her right to be present, and must therefore be absent by 
choice.47  Further, such a defendant should understand that the trial 
will continue without her if she leaves in violation of her duty to be 
present.48  It is assumed that the defendant is aware of both her right 
to be present and the consequences of giving up that right by ab-
sconding.49
B.  The Right to a Fair Trial 
 
The right to a fair trial, “the most fundamental of all freedoms” in 
the American legal system, depends on many other rights.50  In par-
ticular, the right to be present at trial and the presumption of inno-
cence help a defendant protect her right to a fair trial.  The Sixth 
Amendment guarantees, among other things, a “speedy and public 
trial” with an impartial, local jury.51  The Sixth Amendment also 
mandates that a defendant receive assistance from both the govern-
ment (that she be informed of the charges against her) and her at-
torney.52
Sixth Amendment fairness requires that the jury remain impartial 
whenever possible, presuming the defendant innocent until the gov-
ernment proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this is not the case.  
External factors, including “extensive pretrial publicity,”
  These textual requirements create three major restrictions 
on the trial:  the jury must be shielded from commentary and envi-
ronmental factors that threaten its ability to be impartial, the judge 
must carefully avoid creating the impression that she holds any opi-
nion regarding the defendant’s guilt, and the defendant must be able 
to obtain and communicate with defense counsel. 
53 threaten 
the ability of jurors to “be fair and impartial” toward the defendant.54  
Jury sequestration or change of trial venue becomes necessary in cer-
tain cases to counteract the effects of publicity.55
 
 47 See, e.g., Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20. 
  In addition, the 
judge must carefully guard any opinions she holds of the defendant; 
if the judge’s actions or decisions signal to the jury that the judge be-
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965); see also Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779, 781 
(10th Cir. 1942) (“There is no right more sacred to our institutions of government than 
the right to a public trial by a fair and impartial jury; no wrong more grievous than its 
denial . . . .”). 
 51 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Estes, 381 U.S. at 561 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
 54 Id. (quoting Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961)). 
 55 Id. 
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lieves the defendant is guilty56 or dangerous,57 this threatens the fair-
ness of the trial because jurors are likely to rely on their impression of 
the judge’s view of the situation, rather than remaining impartial.58
The defendant’s appearance can also affect jurors’ perceptions of 
the defendant, preventing their ability to judge the case impartially.  
Consider a hypothetical defendant, Claire.  When Claire arrives at 
her trial, she is wearing a bright orange prison-issued jumpsuit, shoes 
without laces, and handcuffs attached to a chain that wraps around 
her waist.
 
59  Jurors might notice Claire’s chains and apparel and as-
sume that the judge determined that the shackling was necessary and 
the prison apparel appropriate,60 because Claire poses a danger to 
everyone else in the courtroom.61  This, in turn, might lead the jurors 
to believe that the judge thinks Claire is guilty of the crime with 
which she is charged.62
 
 56 See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 471–72 (1933) (holding that although the trial 
judge may comment on the evidence, she must maintain an appearance of impartiality 
and cannot make comments to the jury implying her belief that the defendant is guilty); 
see also United States v. Wyatt, 442 F.2d 858, 859–60 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“[T]he trial judge 
should maintain an aura of impartiality so as not to give the jury the impression that he 
believes the defendant is guilty.”). 
  Or, it might lead the jurors to believe that 
 57 See Marquez v. Collins, 11 F.3d 1241, 1243 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing this danger with 
respect to shackling defendant in jury’s presence). 
 58 See Quercia, 289 U.S. at 470–71 (quoting Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894)) 
(noting that the judge’s “‘lightest word or intimation is received with deference [by the 
jury], and may prove controlling’”); Marquez, 11 F.3d at 1243 (“Shackling carries the mes-
sage that the state and the judge think the defendant is dangerous, even in the cour-
troom.”). 
 59 In my personal experience, I witnessed this when prisoners from the Dutchess County Jail 
appeared for town and village court.  See, e.g., Mauricio Guerrero, Stanford Enters Plea; Bail 
Is Set at $500,000, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, at B3 (containing image of R. Allen Stanford 
in orange jumpsuit, handcuffs, and ankle chains). 
 60 This may be the case even if the defendant chooses her apparel, because the jury might 
believe that, in the courtroom, the judge makes this kind of decision.  A defendant may 
not be forced to wear “visible shackles” during trial unless there is an identifiable “special 
need” such as a heightened risk that the defendant will escape.  See Deck v. Missouri, 544 
U.S. 622, 626 (2005). 
 61 Marquez, 11 F.3d at 1243 (“Shackling carries the message that the state and the judge 
think the defendant is dangerous, even in the courtroom.”); see also Deck, 544 U.S. at 630 
(quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986) (noting that the rules prohibiting 
shackling defendants in the jurors’ presence exist to protect, inter alia, the principle that 
a defendant is innocent until proven guilty, and that restraining a defendant “suggests to 
the jury that the justice system itself sees a ‘need to separate a defendant from the com-
munity at large’”)); Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 105–06 (6th Cir. 1973) (discuss-
ing the likelihood of juror bias where the defendant is shackled). 
 62 Cf. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 567–68 (“When . . . the trial judge assiduously works to impress 
jurors with the need to presume the defendant’s innocence, we have trusted that a fair 
result can be obtained.”). 
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Claire is guilty of something, whether the crime charged or another 
bad act, and therefore deserves punishment.63
The inevitable bias against Claire is clear, and the jury is likely to 
judge her based on these assumptions about her appearance rather 
than the evidence presented at the trial.
 
64  This demolishes the im-
partiality required by the Sixth Amendment and removes the pre-
sumption of innocence that must be afforded all criminal defen-
dants—the key protections of the fairness fundamental to American 
criminal trials.65  For this reason, courts cannot require defendants to 
appear at a jury trial in prison apparel or physical restraints without 
special circumstances.66  Even so, many real defendants spend their 
courtroom time, including the trial itself, in shackles or prison-issued 
apparel, which can have the same bias-inducing effect on the jury as 
in Claire’s hypothetical case because of an oversight by the defense 
attorney or misapplication of the law.67
The right to communicate with counsel also protects the right to a 
fair trial.  This Sixth Amendment protection
 
68 was expanded in Gideon 
v. Wainwright69 to require the appointment of counsel for all persons 
accused of crimes, including those unable to afford their own law-
yer.70  Contributing to one’s own defense is critical, and a defendant 
cannot do that unless she has access to a lawyer with whom she can 
communicate.71
 
 63 See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (noting the danger that “the sight of 
shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury’s feelings about the defen-
dant”); see also Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 105–06. 
  The right to the assistance of counsel protects a de-
 64 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504–05 (1976). 
 65 See id. at 503 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[C]ourts must carefully 
guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 66 See Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512; see also Deck, 544 U.S. at 626 (describing the practices regarding 
physical restraints of a defendant during her trial). 
 67 See, e.g., Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512–13 (finding that a trial in which the defendant wore prison 
garb was constitutional and holding that, although a state cannot force a criminal defen-
dant to appear at trial wearing prison-issued clothing, “the failure to make an objection as 
to being tried in such clothes” makes the wearing of the clothes voluntary, not com-
pelled); see also United States v. Stewart, 20 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that, in 
representing himself, the defendant was required to wear leg shackles). 
 68 U.S. CONST.  amend. VI.  A defendant may waive this right, if she does so knowingly and 
willingly after the trial judge has warned her of the seriousness of the charges against her 
and the risks of representing herself.  See also Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 
(1948). 
 69 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963). 
 70 Id. at 344–45. 
 71 See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 
(1932) (“[T]he denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the 
accused and to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of counsel into a 
!
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fendant’s ability to receive a fair trial.72  However, that right loses 
much of its value when the defendant and her counsel are unable to 
communicate.73
The Sixth Amendment effectively guarantees a criminal defen-
dant the right to a fair trial.  This right “must be maintained at all 
costs.”
 
74  A defendant’s presence at trial is a critical tool for maintain-
ing its fairness.  A fair trial requires jury impartiality, judge impartiali-
ty, or at least the perception of impartiality, and the ability of the de-
fendant to obtain and communicate with an attorney.75
II:  Illinois v. Allen:  The Rule and its Progeny 
  The 
defendant can ensure that her trial satisfies all of these requirements 
only if she is actually present to observe and participate in the pro-
ceedings. 
The trial itself is the most critical proceeding in the majority of 
criminal cases that reach that stage.  The actual determination of 
guilt occurs at trial, and it is this proceeding in which the defendant’s 
presence is most likely to affect the fairness of the procedure.76  
Usually, being present at trial increases the likelihood of having a fair 
trial, as it allows the defendant to work with her attorney to present a 
vigorous defense and observe the judge and prosecutor’s behavior, 
noting potential violations of her rights.77
 
sham and nothing more than a formal compliance with the Constitution’s requirement 
that an accused be given the assistance of counsel.”)). 
  However, when a defen-
dant’s in-court appearance or behavior threatens to negatively affect 
the jury’s opinion of her and create a bias against her, these rights 
clash.  Suddenly, the defendant’s presence detracts from one aspect 
 72 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 560 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (noting that “the 
fundamental conception of a fair trial includes . . . the right to counsel” (internal cita-
tions omitted)). 
 73 See Avery, 308 U.S. at 446.  But cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (noting that 
although binding and gagging a defendant technically does not deprive the defendant of 
her right to confront witnesses because she remains in the courtroom with the witnesses, 
it “greatly reduce[s]” her ability to communicate with her attorney and should thus be 
used only as a last resort in controlling a defendant). 
 74 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 540. 
 75 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (requiring an impartial jury); Avery, 308 U.S. at 446 (noting 
defendant’s ability to obtain and confer with counsel); Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 
466, 470–71 (1933) (stating the importance of the appearance of an impartial judge). 
 76 Cf. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 744–46 (1987) (establishing the right to presence 
and finding that the defendant did not have the right to attend a hearing to determine 
whether child witnesses were competent to present testimony because the substance of 
the actual testimony the children would give at trial was not at issue in that hearing). 
 77 The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, supra note 40, at 98. 
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of the fairness of the procedure:  the right to an impartial jury.78  The 
Supreme Court faced this problem in the case of Illinois v. Allen,79 in 
which the defendant was repeatedly threatening and intentionally 
disruptive in front of the jury.80  Allen held that a defendant can lose 
her right to be present at trial if she behaves “in a manner so disor-
derly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that [her] trial cannot 
be carried on with [her] in the courtroom.”81  Although this rule 
made sense as applied to William Allen, cases following the rule es-
tablished in his case show a preoccupation with the Court’s dicta re-
garding maintaining “dignity, order, and decorum” in the cour-
troom, losing sight of the fundamentality of the rights at stake.82
A. The Rule:  Illinois v. Allen 
 
William Allen was charged with armed robbery in Illinois.83  At tri-
al, the judge allowed him to represent himself with the assistance of 
standby counsel to “protect the record . . . insofar as possible.”84  Dur-
ing voir dire, Allen argued “in a most abusive and disrespectful man-
ner” after being told to make his questions more brief.85  In response, 
the judge told standby counsel to take over the defense.86  Allen con-
tinued, saying “[w]hen I go out for lunchtime, you’re (the judge) 
going to be a corpse here.”87  He tore the appointed counsel’s file 
and threw it to the floor.88  The judge threatened to expel Allen from 
the courtroom if Allen had another outburst.89
Allen responded, “[t]here’s not going to be no trial, either.  I’m 
going to sit here and you’re going to talk and you can bring your 
shackles out and straight jacket and put them on me and tape my 
mouth, but it will do no good because there’s not going to be no tri-
al.”
 
90
 
 78 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
  Later, after “more abusive remarks,” the judge ordered Allen 
 79 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 
 80 Id. at 339–40. 
 81 Id. at 343. 
 82 See infra Part II.2 and Part III. 
 83 Allen, 397 U.S. at 338. 
 84 Id. at 339. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 339–40. 
 87 Id. at 340. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
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removed from the courtroom.91  Standby counsel completed voir dire 
and jury selection without Allen.92
Allen was told he could return if he “‘behaved (himself) and (did) 
not interfere with the introduction of the case,’” and Allen re-
turned.
 
93  During preliminary matters, Allen again interrupted, saying 
“[t]here is going to be no proceeding.  I’m going to start talking and 
I’m going to keep on talking all through the trial.  There’s not going 
to be no trial like this.”94  He was again removed.95  When the prose-
cution rested its case-in-chief, Allen returned, promising to behave, 
and he allowed his appointed counsel to conduct the remainder of 
the trial.96
Allen was convicted of the charges and the Illinois Supreme Court 
affirmed his conviction.
 
97  He sought a writ of habeas corpus in feder-
al court, arguing that his exclusion denied him of his Sixth Amend-
ment rights.98  The district court dismissed the petition as frivolous, 
but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held 
that Allen had an absolute right to be present at every stage of the 
proceedings against him, and the district court should have granted 
the writ.99
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the extent of the 
right to be present at trial and held that Allen was properly ex-
cluded.
 
100  The Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment right of 
an accused to “be confronted with the witnesses against” her101 grants 
individuals accused in both federal and state courts102 “the right to be 
present in the courtroom at every stage of [her] trial,” and that that 
right is “[o]ne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Con-
frontation Clause.”103
 
 91 Id. 
  In response to the Seventh Circuit’s determina-
tion that the right of an accused to be present at proceedings against 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 341. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 338–39.  Allen argued that he had been deprived of his right to be present at trial 
and deprived of his liberty without due process of law; he also argued that he was insane 
at the time of the robbery and the trial.  People v. Allen, 226 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. 1967). 
 98 United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 233 (7th Cir. 1969). 
 99 Allen, 397 U.S. at 339. 
100 Id. at 337. 
101 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
102 The Sixth Amendment was incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v. Tex-
as, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
103 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892)). 
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her was absolute, the Court weighed the trial judge’s ability to con-
duct trials against that right.104  The Court found that an absolute 
right to be present would excessively “handicap” the trial judge’s abil-
ity to conduct the trial and suggested that a balancing test was more 
appropriate.105
[A] defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been 
warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disrup-
tive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner 
so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial can-
not be carried on with him in the courtroom.
  The Court determined that 
106
The Court added that “[i]t is essential to the proper administration 
of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks 
of all court proceedings in our country.”
 
107  On that note, it argued 
that, although having to “banish[]” Allen from his own trial was “not 
pleasant[,] . . . our courts, palladiums of liberty as they are, cannot be 
treated disrespectfully with impunity.”108
The Court found that judges may cope with disruptive defendants 
in two other ways:  pausing the trial and holding the defendant in 
contempt until he cooperates, or binding, gagging, and shackling the 
defendant while he is in the courtroom.
 
109  Notably, the Court was 
concerned with defendants who used “outbursts” to delay or curtail 
the trial “as a matter of calculated strategy;” it feared that pausing the 
trial would aid those defendants, rather than deter them.110  Allen ex-
emplified such a defendant.  He repeatedly told the judge that 
“there’s not going to be no trial” and tore his attorney’s files.111  The 
Court noted that even if a defendant loses his right to be present at 
trial, she could regain that right “as soon as [she] is willing to con-
duct [herself] consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in 
the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.”112
 
104 Allen, 397 U.S. at 342. 
 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 343 (internal citations omitted). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 346.  For a criticism of this reasoning, see infra Part V. 
109 Allen, 397 U.S. at 344–45. 
110 Id. at 345 (discussing the potentially fruitless use of contempt as an alternative to exclu-
sion, because defendants might “elect to spend a prolonged period in confinement for 
contempt in the hope that adverse witnesses might be unavailable after a lapse of time”). 
111 Id. at 340. 
112 Id. at 343. 
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B.  The Decorum and Respect Inherent in the Concept of Courts113
The Court did not define decorum in Allen.  It seemed, however, 
to focus on maintaining an atmosphere of dignity and propriety.
 
114
It would degrade our country and our judicial system to permit our 
courts to be bullied, insulted, and humiliated and their orderly progress 
thwarted and obstructed by defendants brought before them charged 
with crimes. . . . [I]f our courts are to remain what the Founders in-
tended, the citadels of justice, their proceedings cannot and must not be 
infected with the sort of scurrilous, abusive language and conduct pa-
raded before the Illinois trial judge in this case.
  
The Court noted that: 
115
The Court thus shifted its focus from maintaining a basic ability to 
conduct the trial to preventing “infection” of the proceedings by 
“scurrilous” language, as if improper language and incongruous be-
havior threatened to plague the nation’s courtrooms with “humiliat-
ing” degradation. 
 
Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that “sabotage and violence” 
justifies removal, but no member of the Court would allow the expul-
sion of a defendant who vocally but not violently “insist[s] on his con-
stitutional rights . . . no matter how obnoxious his philosophy might 
have been to the bench that tried him.”116  Justice Douglas’s com-
ments suggest that he foresaw the expansion of the rule to exclude 
those who “insist on [their] constitutional rights” in addition to those 
who threaten the safety of the proceeding.117
C. After Allen:  The Shift to Courtroom Etiquette 
 
Courts applying Allen have used it to guarantee that their cour-
trooms remain decorous and civil, rather than to guarantee that a de-
fendant’s right to remain at trial be protected unless removal is abso-
lutely necessary.  They have been able to do so because Allen did not 
provide them with a workable standard for when removal is appropri-
ate.118
 
113 Id. 
  Three cases highlight courts’ preference for valuing the effect 
of the defendant’s behavior on courtroom decorum over the relation 
of the behavior to the defendant’s fundamental rights. 
114 Id. at 346–47. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 355–56 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
117 Id. 
118 See Michael E. Tigar, Foreword:  Waiver of Constitutional Rights:  Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1970) (arguing that Allen provides no “new standards or procedures” 
for future application). 
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In Foster v. Wainwright,119 discussed in the introduction,120 Foster at-
tempted to represent himself and objected out of turn, trying to pro-
tect his rights.  For this the trial judge expelled him from the cour-
troom.121  He even respectfully asked for permission to speak on 
occasion, showing that in spite of his recognized imperfect under-
standing of courtroom procedure, he was trying to conform his beha-
vior to appropriate standards.122  The Eleventh Circuit recognized 
that “Foster’s behavior was not nearly so extreme as was the defen-
dant’s in Illinois v. Allen.”123  Unlike Allen, Foster did not threaten an-
yone in the courtroom or physically act out; he merely slowed the 
procedures and did not conform to accepted attorney behavior.124  
His behavior even “fell short of that of most criminal defendants 
whose expulsions have been upheld under Illinois v. Allen.”125  Yet the 
Florida District Court of Appeal, the Florida Supreme Court, the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and 
the Eleventh Circuit found that the trial judge did not violate Foster’s 
right to be present at trial.126
In Saccomanno v. Scully, Joseph Saccomanno, accused of possession 
of stolen property, was excluded from most of his New York City trial 
under Allen based on his disruptive behavior and perceived disrespect 
for the courtroom.
 
127  Saccomanno argued with the judge and his 
lawyer, telling them to call attention to the fact that he had recently 
been shot.128  The judge also felt that he was dressed inappropriate-
ly.129
 
119 686 F.2d 1382 (11th Cir. 1982).  Foster faced charges of assault in Florida.  During pretri-
al motions, Foster resisted testifying because he was not “in open Court” and objected 
several times, once in front of the jury, to his own attorney’s acts.  After several unsuccess-
ful reprimands and instructions to “sit down” and “be quiet,” the judge ordered Foster to 
be removed from the courtroom while the jury was absent.  Id. at 1383–87. 
  And Saccomanno walked around the courtroom rather than sit-
120 See Introduction, supra at 1. 
121 Foster, 686 F.2d at 1385. 
122 See, e.g., id. at 1384–85 (“Is it possible I can get it in open Court?” and “Can I say some-
thing?”). 
123 Id. at 1387. 
124 Compare Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 340 (1970) (noting that defendant tore attorney’s 
files, threw them on the ground, told judge that the judge was “going to be a corpse,” and 
proclaimed that the trial would not take place), with Foster, 686 F.2d at 1384–85 (stating 
that defendant “objected” approximately three times and insisted that a witness testify). 
125 Foster, 686 F.2d at 1387. 
126 Id. at 1387–88.  The Eleventh Circuit decision is the only published decision in Foster’s 
case history, and unfortunately does not indicate the reasoning of the other reviewing 
courts.  See id. 
127 758 F.2d 62, 63–65 (2d Cir. 1985). 
128 Id. at 64. 
129 Id.  The appellate decision does not reflect what Saccomanno wore that offended the 
judge. 
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ting at his table, eventually telling the judge “he would act as his own 
counsel and that he was entitled to ‘make [his] own outburst.’”130
The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted 
Saccomanno’s habeas petition, finding that his behavior was “not so 
disorderly or disruptive as to make it exceedingly difficult or impossi-
ble to carry on the trial in his presence.”
 
131  The Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit disagreed.132  In reversing, the Second Circuit em-
phasized that great deference was due to both the trial court and the 
state appellate review of the issue, and that the defendant’s behavior 
did satisfy the Allen standard.133
Finally, David Williams, facing federal drug and firearms charges, 
waived his right to an attorney and chose to represent himself during 
many of his pretrial hearings and at trial.
  Saccomanno, like Foster, was unplea-
sant and upset the proper courtroom environment by wearing inap-
propriate clothing and disagreeing with the judge.  However, he did 
not materially obstruct the progress of the trial or make any threats. 
134  In his attempt to 
represent himself, he objected frequently for illogical reasons, such as 
to claim that the court had forced him to “sign a contract under 
fraud and misrepresentation.”135  In response to Williams’ objections, 
the trial judge removed Williams from the courtroom three times 
during voir dire and after the end of the first day of trial.136  He did 
not return to trial until the close of the evidence, outside the pres-
ence of the jury, and was quickly removed again because he “inter-
rupted the judge and objected to every question.”137  He watched as a 
standby attorney created a theory of defense and proceeded with the 
case without him, and watched the jury convict him, on closed-circuit 
television.138
The Eighth Circuit affirmed Williams’ conviction.  It reviewed the 
lower court decision for “abuse of discretion” and applied harmless 
error analysis.
 
139  The court determined that under Allen, Williams’ 
constant objections provided sufficient grounds for the removal.140
 
130 Id.  
  
Yet Williams’ conduct, though nonsensical and undoubtedly out of 
131 Id. at 65. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 65–66. 
134 United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 1115, 1117, 1119 (8th Cir. 2005). 
135 Id. at 1119. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 1119–20. 
140 Id. 
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place in the criminal trial, did not make continuation of the trial im-
possible.  It probably made the trial’s progression somewhat more 
difficult, but it was neither dangerous nor intentionally obstruction-
ist.141
These cases demonstrate that the Allen standard has evolved to in-
clude defendant behavior that is “not nearly so extreme”
 
142 as Allen’s 
destructive and threatening performance.143
III:  A Precedent Without a Framework:  The Evolution of Illinois v. Allen 
  In particular, they reveal 
a preoccupation with maintaining proper courtroom etiquette:  wear-
ing the proper apparel, remaining seated during the trial, and work-
ing entirely within the confines of the rules lawyers learn through 
years of education and practice, even if the individual lacks that edu-
cation and practice. 
The Allen decision created a barrage of Constitutional problems 
regarding an accused’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
First, the ambiguity of the rule enumerated in the decision allows 
lower courts to focus on preserving the “dignity, order and decorum” 
of the courtroom, and ignore whether the trial “cannot be carried on 
with [the defendant] in the courtroom.”144
A. The Shift from Ability to Conduct the Trial to Dignity and Decorum 
  Second, the ambiguity of 
the rule increases the likelihood that jurors will interpret judge-
imposed removal of a defendant as the judge’s belief that the defen-
dant is guilty of a crime, dangerous, or undeserving of a place in the 
courtroom.  Third and finally, by giving the trial judge maximum dis-
cretion and minimum guidance on when to remove the defendant, 
appellate courts effectively give free reign to the trial judge to deter-
mine when to remove defendants. 
Although the Supreme Court noted that a defendant should not 
be removed from her trial unless her behavior prevents the trial from 
continuing in her presence, it based this rule on the importance of 
removing sources of “disorder[], disrupti[on], and disrespect[]” from 
the courtroom.145
 
141 The Eighth Circuit did not suggest that Williams was trying to obstruct the trial with his 
outbursts.  See id. 
  This focus on the courtroom atmosphere, rather 
than the defendant’s rights, created ambiguity over how lower courts 
142 Foster v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1382, 1387–88 (11th Cir. 1982). 
143 See supra Part II. 
144 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). 
145 Id. 
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should determine whether removing the defendant is constitutionally 
permissible.146
The defendants discussed in Part II.C behaved in a manner fun-
damentally different from the way that Allen behaved.  Williams, Sac-
comanno, and Foster did not attempt to delay or entirely prevent the 
completion of the trial; each of them simply tried to exercise his con-
stitutional rights and work within the trial structure, but as pro se de-
fendants without a legal background, they struggled with this.  Al-
though the three defendants argued with the trial judges, they did 
not threaten anyone in the courtroom, as Allen did.
  Lower courts have consequently emphasized the anal-
ysis of courtroom decorum while minimizing discussion of the trial 
judges’ ability to continue the trial, thereby obscuring defendants’ 
rights to maintain a professional atmosphere in the judges’ place of 
work. 
147
Under Allen, as trial judges have interpreted that case, a judge can 
justify ejecting a pro se defendant, who has not communicated with 
any stand-in attorney, as soon as she makes a few evidentiary errors, 
on the basis of preservation of the decorum of the courtroom.  If a 
defendant’s flawed attempt to represent himself, without bad motives 
and without posing a danger to anyone, justifies expulsion, then the 
rights to have and waive assistance of counsel and to be present at tri-
al have little meaning.
 
148
 
146 Tigar, supra note 118, at 11 (“[T]he Court converts waiver into a punitive sanction, but 
without setting down any new standards or procedures for its application.”). 
 
147 See United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2005) (describing Williams’ 
disruptions as he attempted to represent himself); Saccomanno v. Scully, 758 F.2d 62, 64–
65 (2d Cir. 1985) (summarizing the defendant’s offensive courtroom conduct); Foster v. 
Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1382, 1387–88 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining Foster’s behavior and 
expulsions from the courtroom during his trial); cf. Allen, 397 U.S. at 338–40 (describing 
Allen’s courtroom behavior, which included threats directed towards the judge). 
148 This is not to say, however, that all courts applying Allen place decorum over ability to 
continue the trial.  For example, in United States v. Ward, the court recognized: 
[T]he narrower holding in Allen—a defendant may be removed if he “insists on 
conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the 
court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.” . . . As this holding 
makes clear, “[b]ehavior that is merely disruptive is insufficient under Allen to jus-
tify removal.” 
  United States v. Ward, 598 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Tatum v. United States, 
703 A.2d 1218, 1223 (D.C. App. 1997)).  The Eighth Circuit recognized that “both de-
fense counsel and the judge wanted to be free of Ward’s interruptions,” and his “absence 
no doubt ensured a smoother trial, probably to Ward’s ultimate advantage.”  Ward, 598 
F.3d at 1059.  The fluidity of the trial, however, was secondary to the “more powerful, 
constitutionally mandated concern,” Ward’s right to be present.  Id.  The court con-
cluded that a “defendant’s constitutional right to be present at his trial includes the right 
to be an irritating fool in front of a jury of his peers.”  Id.  As discussed in this Article, the 
majority of courts do not appear to share that mentality. 
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B. Effect of Unnecessary Removals on the Jury 
The Allen rule increases rather than decreases the risk that the 
jury will become biased.  Jurors are likely to view the forced removal 
of the defendant as reflecting the judge’s personal conviction about 
the defendant, and thus removal should only occur when absolutely 
necessary.  With a defendant’s initial “outburst,” there is inevitably a 
danger that jurors will view the defendant as obnoxious, dangerous, 
or simply a bad person.  This first jury reaction can occur regardless 
of the rule regarding removal of the defendant.  However, when a 
judge decides to remove the defendant from the courtroom, that ac-
tion can solidify any negative inferences the jurors make in response 
to the initial outburst.149  The decision to remove the defendant may 
suggest to the jurors that the judge sees the defendant as a wrong-
doer, and that perception might have a strong effect on the jurors’ 
opinions of the defendant.150  However, the jury is not always present 
during the defendant’s period of disruptive behavior, and in those 
cases even this danger is not present.151
If the judge removes a defendant like Charles Foster, whose beha-
vior did not conform to accepted practice, but who tried to work 
within the confines of the judicial process, the jurors might infer that 
the defendant’s behavior was more than simply distracting.
 
152  They 
might believe that the judge knows something about the defendant 
that requires his removal.153  Perhaps they will believe that the defen-
dant has a history of violent outbursts when provoked.  The juror is 
likely to place undue weight on the judge’s action154
 
149 Cf. Peter David Blanck, The Appearance of Justice:  The Appearance of Justice Revisited, 86 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 887, 891–92 (1996) (noting that “juries accord great weight and 
deference to even the most subtle behaviors of the judge” and that a judge’s belief about 
the guilt of the defendant often becomes a “self-fulfilling prophec[y]”). 
 and could allow 
it to influence the outcome of the trial, determining the defendant’s 
150 Cf. Marquez v. Collins, 11 F.3d 1241, 1243 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that the “appearance of 
a defendant in shackles and handcuffs before a jury in a capital case requires careful scru-
tiny” because it “carries the message that the . . . judge think[s] the defendant is danger-
ous . . .”). 
151 For example, Williams’ outbursts occurred during hearings that occurred outside the 
presence of the jury.  United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 2005). 
152 Though jurors may be instructed not to consider a defendant’s removal or absence, they 
may nonetheless wonder about it during their decisionmaking.  See Ward, 598 F.3d at 
1060 (featuring jurors deliberating a case in which defendant had been removed sent a 
note to the judge during deliberation asking why the defendant was not present at trial). 
153 Cf. Blanck, supra note 149, at 891–92 (explaining that jurors’ assessments during a trial 
are shaped by the judge’s behavior); Marquez, 11 F.3d at 1243 (discussing the impression 
created by shackling a defendant during trial). 
154 See Blanck, supra note 149, at 891–92. 
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guilt or innocence based on factors other than the evidence pre-
sented.155
C.  Absence of Effective Appellate Review 
 
Finally, the deferential standard of review applied to Allen remov-
als provides trial judges with the opportunity to remove defendants 
for more minor infractions than the rule imagines.  Appellate courts 
review trial judges’ decisions to remove defendants from trial for 
abuse of discretion and apply harmless error analysis.156  A court 
abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is “erroneous” and 
“clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances be-
fore the court or the reasonable, probable and actual deductions to 
be drawn therefrom.”157  An error is harmless if it probably did not af-
fect the outcome of the proceeding.158  This means that, in order to 
obtain a new trial, on direct appeal the defendant must prove that (1) 
the trial judge’s decision to exclude the defendant was not merely in-
correct but so clearly incorrect that it was unreasonable,159 and (2) 
that error affected the outcome of the trial.160  Under this highly de-
ferential standard, appellate courts may disagree with trial courts’ de-
cisions and even find them “troublesome” without upsetting that de-
cision.161  In addition, the record of the trial court proceedings is 
often unclear, rendering the reviewing court’s job guesswork.162
In federal habeas petitions, the reviewing court accords a “pre-
sumption of correctness” to state court factual findings and applica-
tions of law
 
163
 
155 See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (“Central to the right to a fair trial, guar-
anteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, is the principle that ‘one accused of a 
crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evi-
dence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of . . . circumstances not adduced as proof 
at trial.’” (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978)). 
 and under statutory law the petition cannot be granted 
unless the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
156 See Williams, 431 F.3d at 1119. 
157 Dunbar v. Dunbar, 251 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 1969). 
158 See, e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 284 F.3d 965, 968–69  (8th Cir. 2002). 
159 See United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that appellate review 
of a trial court’s decision for reasonableness is “akin to our traditional review for abuse of 
discretion”). 
160 See Shepherd, 284 F.3d at 968–69. 
161 Id. at 967 (upholding defendant’s removal from the courtroom even though they found 
that the trial judge’s decision to remove without warning was “troublesome, under the 
facts of this case,” because of the “deference due the trial judge”). 
162 See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d 597, 599 nn.4–5  (9th Cir. 2004). 
163 Saccomanno v. Scully, 758 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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by the Supreme Court of the United States.”164  The presumption of 
correctness alone can require affirmation of removal, as it did in Sac-
comanno’s habeas case.165
IV:  Recalibrating the Balance:  Focus on Fairness, Not Etiquette 
  Even more than under abuse of discretion 
review, this standard leaves trial courts with minimal oversight in its 
decision. 
To prevent trial judges from placing the decorous atmosphere of 
their courtroom above the constitutional right of an accused to be 
present at her trial, the accused must have the right to remain 
present at her trial unless her absence would clearly and substantially 
increase the fairness of the trial.  Such a test is consistent with Ken-
tucky v. Stincer, which states that an accused has the right to be 
present at any critical proceeding where her presence will contribute 
to the fairness of that proceeding.166  The test is effective in other 
proceedings such as competency hearings,167
First, as the Court recognized in Allen with respect to binding and 
gagging the defendant,
 and applying it to exclu-
sion from the trial itself will protect the constitutional rights that are 
disregarded under Allen. 
168 the trial judge must look to removal of the 
defendant as a “last resort.”169  Before considering removal, the judge 
must employ alternatives such as holding a disruptive defendant in 
contempt of court for a short period of time, pausing the trial.170
 
164 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1) (2006); see also Gray v. Moore, 520 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir. 2008). 
  Ad-
ditionally, if the judge determines that the defendant’s objective is 
not to delay the trial, and the judge has not had success with holding 
the defendant in contempt, the judge should order a new trial before 
continuing the trial without the defendant.  If the judge finds that 
these alternatives are not successful, she should determine whether to 
remove based on whether it will clearly and substantially increase the 
likelihood of achieving a fair trial, applying the factors listed below 
and noting in the record how each factor applies.  The use of clear 
factors will provide guidance for both the trial judge in making the 
165 Saccomanno, 758 F.2d at 65–66. 
166 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987); see also supra Part I.B. 
167 Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745. 
168 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970). 
169 Id. 
170 The Allen Court recognized this option as a feasible first attempt at controlling a disrup-
tive defendant.  See id. at 345. 
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decision and the reviewing court in analyzing that determination on 
appeal. 
A. Determining Whether Removal Will Clearly and Substantially Increase 
the Fairness of the Proceedings 
Trial judges should consider five factors in determining whether 
removing the defendant will clearly and substantially increase the li-
kelihood that she will receive a fair trial.  These factors consider the 
defendant’s right to be present at trial in the context of her right to 
an impartial jury and the assistance of counsel.  If a judge decides to 
remove a defendant, she must first state, on the record, her applica-
tion of the factors to the defendant’s behavior.  This can be as brief as 
a sentence about each and should be done in the presence of the at-
torneys but not necessarily in earshot of the jury.  It can be treated 
like a ruling on an objection that the court makes at a sidebar. 
First, to the extent possible, the court should consider the defen-
dant’s motivation in creating the disruption.  This is closely related to 
the consideration of contempt.  If it is clear that the defendant’s pur-
pose is to delay the trial, holding the defendant in contempt or re-
quiring a new trial will only encourage the defendant to continue dis-
rupting.  In that case, this type of motivation may support removal.  
However, the court must “indulge every reasonable presumption 
against the loss of constitutional rights”171 and should thus presume 
that a defendant does not bear such an ill motive unless it is suffi-
ciently clear.172
Second, the trial judge should consider the extent to which the 
defendant is creating a jury bias against herself through her disrup-
tion.  The judge should consider whether the defendant is using of-
fensive language, acting violently, or making or insinuating threats.  
  If no such motive is apparent, or it is clear that the 
defendant is simply trying to exercise her right to represent herself, 
assist in her defense, or understand the nature of the proceedings, 
the court should be patient with the defendant and attempt to use 
other means of addressing the issue, such as providing a standby at-
torney to assist with evidentiary rules.  If the defendant’s objective is 
to cooperate and work within the constructs of the proceeding, hold-
ing her in contempt or pausing the trial will motivate her to correct 
her behavior because of her desire to complete the trial. 
 
171 Id. at 343 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (internal citations omit-
ted)). 
172 For example, Allen’s contention that “there’s not going to be no trial” would satisfy this 
burden.  Allen, 397 U.S. at 340. 
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Threatening, violent, and offensive behavior might make the jury feel 
the defendant is guilty regardless of the evidence presented by the at-
torneys, undermining the proper function of the trial.173
Third, and closely related to the second factor, the court should 
consider the effect on the jury of removing the defendant, particular-
ly if done by force.  In the case of a non-threatening defendant, the 
jury might interpret a removal as reflecting a judge’s belief that the 
defendant is guilty of the crime charged or another crime, or simply 
dangerous and deserving of punishment.
  Additional-
ly, if the accused is frequently arguing with the judge, the judge 
should consider whether those clashes are likely to bias the jury 
against the defendant, or, on the other hand, if they are comparable 
in nature and quantity to the expected tension between an attorney 
and a judge.  If the defendant only misbehaves outside of the pres-
ence of the jury, there is no danger that her actions will bias the jury. 
174
Fourth, where the defendant’s in-court behavior is itself unlaw-
ful,
  If the jurors are present 
during the actual removal, they might view a defendant’s struggle or 
protest as further evidence of her guilt or dangerousness.  On the 
other hand, they might take pity on the defendant and decide that 
she has been punished enough, regardless of whether she is guilty of 
the crime charged.  If the defendant disappears while the jurors are 
absent, they may be confused.  They may wonder:  Did the defendant 
choose to leave the trial in the jury’s absence?  Did something hap-
pen that required her to leave?  Did the judge want to hide some-
thing from the jury?  In any case, the jurors rely on improper infor-
mation to determine their judgment.  The trial judge should limit the 
risk of this by minimizing the instances in which she removes the de-
fendant.  In some cases, however, removal may make the jurors feel 
more safe, in which case this factor will weigh in favor of removal. 
175
 
173 The judge need not wait until the defendant has acted out in the presence of the jury 
before determining that her behavior will negatively bias the jury, but the behavior must 
be clearly and substantially likely to bias the jury.  It is not the judge’s duty to prevent all 
potential bias and preemptively remove the defendant.  Cf. United States v. Ward, 598 
F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2010) (“A defendant’s constitutional right to be present at his 
trial includes the right to be an irritating fool in front of a jury of his peers.”). 
 the judge should consider whether new charges against the de-
fendant will effectively deter disruptions.  If so, a momentary pause in 
174 See supra Part III.2. 
175 For example, a defendant who threatened the judge, as Allen did, would fall into this cat-
egory.  Allen, 397 U.S. at 340 (“When I go out for lunchtime, you’re [the judge] going to 
be a corpse here.”) (internal quotations omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (2006) 
(prohibiting threatening a judge). 
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the trial for arrest or citation for that illegal action may be sufficient, 
eliminating the need to remove the defendant. 
Fifth and finally, the trial judge should consider whether remov-
ing the defendant will substantially hinder counsel’s ability to 
represent her.  This inquiry will be particularly relevant for pro se de-
fendants who have not communicated extensively—if they have 
communicated at all—with standby counsel if standby counsel has 
been appointed.  If no standby counsel was appointed, the problem is 
even greater.176  Removing a defendant from trial under circums-
tances that make it impossible for the attorney (or standby counsel) 
to provide effective representation deprives the defendant of both 
her presence and her assistance of counsel, two fundamental rights.  
This creates an even more serious deprivation than where the defen-
dant’s attorney is able to effectively defend her client without the 
client present.  In addition to a lack of communication between at-
torney and client, the need for the client’s presence might occur 
where the attorney needs on-the-spot feedback from the defendant 
about a witness’s testimony or defense strategy.177
These factors provide a clear structure for the trial judge to assess 
the effect of removing the defendant on the fairness of the trial, pre-
venting the judge from considering only the atmosphere of her cour-
troom.  The factors should receive equal weight in consideration.  
Where some factors weigh in favor and some weigh against removal, 
removal is probably inappropriate unless the “in favor” factors weigh 
strongly in favor of removal and the “against” factors weigh only 
slightly against removal.  Thus, the court should balance the factors, 
favoring keeping the defendant in the courtroom. 
 
B.  Allen, Williams, and Foster Under the Five-Factor Approach 
Under the proposed test for removal of a disruptive defendant, 
only those defendants that cannot be deterred by other means and 
are significantly detracting from the fairness of the trial can be re-
moved without violating their right to be present during trial.  The 
comparison of the results of Allen,178 Williams,179 and Foster180
 
176 See United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 2004) 
 under the 
proposed test are illustrative. 
177 Cf. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (discussing the general importance of 
communication between attorney and defendant). 
178 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). 
179 United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2005). 
180 Foster v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1382, 1387 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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1.   Illinois v. Allen 
As the Supreme Court noted, the trial court in Allen’s case could 
have considered initiating contempt proceedings against Allen before 
forcibly removing him from the courtroom.181  However, Allen was 
clearly “determined to prevent any trial;”182  Allen was at least in part 
interested in subverting his entire trial:  he yelled “there’s not going 
to be no trial” to the judge shortly before being removed.183
Allen’s behavior weighs strongly in favor of removal under the 
first, second, and third factors of the test.  Allen clearly intended to 
stop the trial.
  This 
suggests that contempt would not have deterred Allen, and the trial 
judge could consider removal. 
184  He made threats and was physically aggressive in 
front of the jury,185 suggesting to the jurors that he was a violent per-
son.  This created a great risk of jury bias.  Allen’s behavior was prob-
ably so prejudicial that his absence would not substantially bias the 
jury under the third factor.  Thus, because Allen’s behavior was high-
ly prejudicial and intended to prevent the trial from continuing,186 
not to assist in his own defense, removal from the courtroom would 
remain appropriate under the proposed standard.187  Although 
threatening a judge is illegal,188 Allen appears to have been so deter-
mined to prevent the trial that another charge would not deter him.  
Thus, the fourth factor would favor removal.  Finally, Allen’s hostility 
toward counsel (who had been ordered to take over the case) while 
he was in the courtroom suggests that under the fifth factor the at-
torney might actually be able to improve representation after Allen 
left because, at least, no one would tear apart the case files.189
2.   United States v. Williams 
 
The trial judge in Williams’ case does not appear to have consi-
dered contempt proceedings before removing Williams, the first re-
 
181 Allen, 397 U.S. at 344–45. 
182 Id. at 345. 
183 Id. at 340. 
184 Id. 
185 Allen told the judge, “you’re going to be a corpse here” and proceeded to tear his attor-
ney’s file and throw the torn papers to the floor. Id. at 339–40. 
186 See id. at 340. 
187 Threatening a judge is a federal crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (2006), but Allen did 
not appear to fear criminal prosecution—he instead challenged it in open court.  See Illi-
nois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 340 (1970).  This factor would not outweigh the other factors. 
188 See 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
189 Allen, 397 U.S. at 340. 
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quirement of the test.190  Under the first prong, Williams’ motive in 
making the meritless objections appears to have been to represent 
himself, not to delay the trial:  Williams continued to attempt to work 
within the confines of court procedures by actively “objecting” rather 
than simply interrupting.191  Thus, contempt or a new trial might have 
persuaded Williams to control his behavior.  Under the second 
prong, Williams did not threaten anyone or act in a physically aggres-
sive way.192
Williams represented himself in his trial, though the court ap-
pointed standby counsel.
  The jury probably considered Williams somewhat obstruc-
tive and very confused, but not dangerous or necessarily guilty of 
something.  Under the third prong of the proposed analysis, remov-
ing Williams could have prejudiced the jury in two ways:  either as 
proof of the judge’s belief that Williams was guilty or as a signal that 
the judge was unduly harsh.  Both of these responses are discussed in 
the analysis of Foster’s case, below. 
193  Thus, under the fifth prong the trial 
court would need to consider whether removing Williams from the 
courtroom would inhibit standby counsel’s ability to adequately 
represent him.  Williams continued to object when the judge asked 
standby attorney to take over.194  This suggests that Williams was not 
willing to communicate with the attorney, and, thus, the attorney 
might not be aware of the defense that Williams planned to present.  
On the other hand, Williams does not seem to have had a coherent 
sense of the proceedings or a theory of the defense himself—he was 
preoccupied with claiming that his name was copyrighted and that he 
was an ambassador, even though he was facing drug and gun 
charges.195
 
190 United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that the trial judge 
repeatedly warned Williams that he would remove him, then actually removed him, with-
out prior or intermediate attempts to subdue Williams). 
  If that was the case, Williams absence would not have con-
tributed to his attorney’s ability to present a defense.  Thus, the final 
factor could fall on either side and probably should not be determin-
ative, but the first three factors suggest that removal was inappro-
priate:  Williams did not intend to subvert the trial process, nor did 
he act in a manner that would engender jury bias against him. 
191 Id. 
192 Compare Allen, 397 U.S. at 340 (noting that Allen told the judge “you’re going to be a 
corpse” and tore and threw his attorney’s files), with Williams, 431 F.3d at 1119 (noting 
that Williams made repeated, meritless objections, claiming that his name was trade-
marked and that he was an ambassador with an “epistle number”). 
193 Williams, 431 F.3d at 1119. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 1115. 
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3.   Foster v. Wainwright 
Foster’s removal would likewise not have been justified under the 
five-factor test.  The Eleventh Circuit relied on the fact that Foster ac-
knowledged and was undeterred by the threat of criminal con-
tempt.196  However, Foster’s behavior suggested that although he was 
confused, he simply wished to protect his rights and actively partici-
pate in the trial, not to harass or intimidate anyone or delay the pro-
ceedings.197  Thus, the first prong would militate against removal.  
Under the second prong, Foster’s behavior probably did not create a 
major jury bias for the same reasons that Williams’ behavior would 
not have created a jury bias.  Foster’s removal, on the other hand, 
could have prejudiced the jury in two ways:  (1) the jurors might have 
concluded that removal was an indication that Foster was rightly in 
trouble for doing something wrong; or (2) they might have con-
cluded that the judge was the wrongdoer, taking offense at the de-
fendant’s attempts to protect himself and evoking excessive sympathy 
for the defendant.  The third factor favors allowing him to remain in 
trial.  Foster’s behavior was not illegal, making the fourth prong irre-
levant.  The extent to which Foster worked with his attorney is un-
clear, but there is no indication that he intentionally tried to sabotage 
his attorney’s work as Allen did.198  Thus, the removal would have 
been inappropriate under the proposed test because both the first 
and third factors suggested that Foster should remain in the cour-
troom and no factors strongly favored removal.199
Under the five-factor test, only defendants that behave in a way 
that is so negative they prevent the jury from remaining impartial, or 
who are clearly attempting to subvert the trial process, will lose their 
right to be present at trial.  In each case, the trial judge has more 
concrete factors with which to determine whether she will be violat-
ing the defendant’s right to be present, rather than being left with 
the ambiguous words of Allen that leave room for judges to exclude 
 
 
196 Foster v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1382, 1385 (11th Cir. 1982). 
197 For example, before swearing in as a witness, Foster said, “I don’t understand.  What’s it 
all about first?”  Id. at 1384.  This suggests that Foster was simply trying to understand 
what was happening to him and he was not trying to undermine the process. 
198 See id. at 1385–86 (noting that Foster wished to represent himself and occasionally ob-
jected to his attorney, but not pointing to any instance in which Foster threatened or 
acted out toward his attorney). 
199 The remaining three factors reinforce this conclusion:  Foster’s pleas for justice likely 
would not bias the jury in the way that a violent defendant’s behavior might, see Illinois v. 
Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); the activities were not illegal so the fourth prong is irrelevant; 
and Foster was not assisting his attorney, challenging him but allowing him to continue to 
represent him, see Foster, 686 F.2d at 1385. 
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defendants based on their annoying conduct, so long as it arguably 
upsets the “dignity” of the courtroom.200
In addition to providing guidelines for trial courts, the five-factor 
test permits better appellate review because it provides a framework 
through which to review the decision.  This review function will work 
best if trial judges are required to place their considerations of the 
five factors on the record, as federal judges are already required to do 
in sentencings with respect to various sentencing factors.
 
201
C. Potential Criticism of the Five-Factor Test 
  This will 
allow the appellate court to better understand the trial judge’s 
thought process and to compare the record, which, though cold, will 
likely give some indication of the events at trial as they pertain to 
each factor.  Even the abuse of discretion standard of review will have 
more teeth with the five-factor test.  Instead of considering only 
whether the trial judge reasonably concluded that the defendant was 
preventing the trial from continuing, or offending the dignity of the 
courtroom, a reviewing court will be able to review concrete, specific 
factors. 
Although a shift toward fairness might at first seem impractical or 
nebulous, the Allen test is itself ambiguous and provides almost no 
guidelines for trial judges in determining whether removal is appro-
priate.202  The Allen rule provided only the instruction that when the 
defendant “insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, 
disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be car-
ried on with him in the courtroom.”203  As previously discussed,204 this 
standard is abstract because it does not provide trial judges with an 
explanation of what behavior rises to the level of impossibility of car-
rying on the trial and ambiguous because the Court never clarifies 
whether the ability to continue the trial or maintaining “appropriate 
courtroom atmosphere”205 is the actual focus of the test.206
 
200 See Allen, 397 U.S. at 343. 
  Thus, any 
201 See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–52 (2007) (discussing the district court’s 
responsibility for considering all of the factors put forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in deter-
mining the defendant’s sentence). 
202 See Tigar, supra note 118, at 11 (“[T]he Court converts waiver into a punitive sanction, but 
without setting down any new standards or procedures for its application.”). 
203 Allen, 397 U.S. at 343. 
204 See supra Part III. 
205 Allen, 397 U.S. at 343. 
206 For example, immediately after discussing the defendant’s disrespectful conduct as an 
impediment to conducting the trial (implying that the real problem was the judge’s ina-
bility to continue the trial), the Court added, “[i]t is essential to the proper administra-
!
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structure and clarity will constitute an improvement on the Allen test.  
Nor does the proposed test excessively burden the trial judge or grant 
too much leeway to disruptive defendants.  Instead, it reduces the po-
tential for jury bias with a real solution rather than an ameliorating 
instruction at the close of the case and improves appellate review of 
removal.  Finally, the five-factor test protects the court’s role as an 
arena for zealously protecting liberty, not for perfecting etiquette. 
This Article proposes that the trial judge (and reviewing court) 
consider five concrete factors in assessing whether removing the de-
fendant will clearly and substantially increase the fairness of the trial.  
This both provides guidelines for the trial judge in considering what 
fairness means in this context and forces the judge to justify the re-
moval in the same clear terms of the factors, which a reviewing court 
will then understand and be able to analyze. 
The five-factor test will not impose a burden on the trial judge, 
though it requires her to consider multiple factors and explain her 
reasoning during the trial.  First, even under the Allen test, the trial 
judge must warn the defendant that her behavior could lead to ex-
pulsion before actually removing her.207
Trial judges frequently make on-the-spot decisions for which they 
must place their reasoning on the record,
  This implies that even under 
the insufficiently protective Allen standard a judge cannot silence a 
defendant the moment she begins to disrupt the proceedings, and 
must discuss the disruption with the defendant and, probably the de-
fendant’s attorney, through a warning.  Under the proposed rule, the 
judge will need to shift her focus away from decorum, but the factors 
are not complicated or unrelated to each other or the proceedings.  
A judge dealing with an obstreperous defendant will likely consider 
the nature of the defendant’s disruption—whether the defendant is 
trying to protect his rights or impede the trial—and the impression 
on the jury as they observe the defendant from the beginning. 
208
 
tion of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court 
proceedings in our country.  The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary 
standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated.”  Id.  This focus on 
maintaining an appropriately dignified courtroom environment suggests that the ability 
to conduct the trial is secondary to the need for a dignified atmosphere. 
 including in deciding 
whether to admit evidence that one party claims is excessively pre-
207 Id. (“[A] defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by 
the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless 
[does so].”). 
208 This could occur at a sidebar or otherwise out of the jury’s hearing. 
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judicial and lacks probative value.209  This determination also hinges 
on the danger of admitting evidence that may unfairly prejudice the 
jury,210
Nor is it fair to characterize a defendant’s distracting conduct as a 
waiver of her right to be present.  Unlike a defendant’s voluntary de-
parture after the judge tells her that she has the right to remain in 
the courtroom and that the trial will continue without her should she 
leave,
 just as the trial judge must determine whether disruptive de-
fendants will unfairly prejudice the jury.  It will take only a few mo-
ments to list the five factors and give a brief explanation of the 
judge’s decision on each at a sidebar.  The parties need not have the 
opportunity to make arguments because the goal is to end an undue 
interruption of the trial, not to extend the interruption.  Thus, listing 
the factors that the judge believes justify removal will not require sub-
stantially more effort than the many other determinations she must 
make throughout the trial. 
211 the disruptive defendant may not be trying to defy the 
judge—she simply may be  asking questions or attempting properly to 
object.  Thus, the removal is not voluntary and thus cannot be consi-
dered a waiver.212
A simple jury instruction will not suffice to solve the problem of 
an unruly defendant or to erase an outburst from the memory of the 
jury.  Unfairly prejudicial evidence cannot be included and then 
made not prejudicial with an ameliorating jury instruction; rules of 
exclusion exist to prevent such a situation.
 
213
The Supreme Court’s desire to protect the dignity of American 
courtrooms, “palladiums of liberty as they are,”
  Similarly, excessively 
prejudicial behavior, on the part of the judge or the defendant, can-
not be mended with a jury instruction. 
214 cannot serve as an 
excuse to take away the liberties that define the American legal, and 
particularly judicial, system.  Such a claim follows the reasoning of 
Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Texas v. Johnson.215
 
209 In federal court, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states, in relevant part, “The court may 
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger 
of . . .  unfair prejudice . . . .”  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
  The case in-
volved a Texas statute that prohibited desecration of the American 
210 See id. 
211 See supra Part I.B. 
212 See Tigar, supra note 118, at 10–11 (discussing the Court’s problematic conversion of 
waiver into a punitive sanction in Allen). 
213 See id. at 21 (noting the importance of exclusionary rules’ deterrent effect to procedural 
fairness). 
214 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346 (1970). 
215 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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flag.216  The majority struck down the law as a violation of the First 
Amendment right to free speech, as burning the flag constituted 
symbolic speech critical of the United States.217
Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist argued that because the flag symbo-
lizes all of the liberties the United States protects, including speech, it 
should be regarded as special and criticism by desecration should fall 
outside the protection of the First Amendment in the same way that 
obscenity is regarded as outside the scope of the First Amendment.
 
218  
In Allen, the Court emphasized the liberties protected by the judicial 
process to justify limiting one of those liberties,219 just as the speech 
that the American flag protects, for Justice Rehnquist, justified limit-
ing speech.  Yet, as Justice Kennedy stated in his concurrence, we do 
not protect liberties by constricting them; we protect liberties by 
upholding them.220
CONCLUSION 
 
Since 1970, American trial courts have too frequently removed de-
fendants from their trials—procedures that determine whether the 
defendant’s future will be spent in confinement, with a tarnished 
reputation, or as a free individual, cleared of the charges against 
them.  Rather than consider the defendant’s fundamental right to be 
present at the trial, the courts concern themselves with preserving an 
air of decorum and proper etiquette in their courtrooms.  Practiced 
trial attorneys understand the expectations of the courtroom, but de-
fendants are dragged into the courtroom without the education, ex-
perience, or desire to be there that the lawyers hold.  It is inappro-
priate and offends the defendant’s dignity to be rebuked for failure 
to take Trial Advocacy before being arrested, or for forgetting to tuck 
in her shirt before entering the courtroom. 
Rather than expect the accused to perfect her etiquette, or the 
pro se defendant to memorize and comprehend every rule of evi-
dence and procedure before she represents herself, judges must em-
ploy a fairness standard when determining whether removing a dis-
ruptive defendant is permissible.  The trial judge will properly 
balance the defendant’s right to be present at trial against the prob-
 
216 Id. at 400 (Brennan, J.). 
217 Id. at 420. 
218 Id. at 430 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
219 Allen, 397 U.S. at 346. 
220 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is poignant but fundamental that 
the flag protects those who hold it in contempt.”). 
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lems arising from disruptions only if she uses the fairness of the pro-
ceedings as her scale.  She will protect the defendant’s rights to be 
present and to a fair trial only if she only resorts to removing that de-
fendant from the courtroom where removal will clearly and substan-
tially increase the fairness of the trial.  If the courts are to remain 
“palladiums of liberty,”221 they must be flexible enough to allow de-
fendants who recognize that they are in court “for justice”222
 
221 Allen, 397 U.S. at 346. 
 the right 
to protect their liberty and their constitutional rights by staying in the 
courtroom during trial. 
222 Foster v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1382, 1385 (11th Cir. 1982). 
